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Note Title

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Schöningh, Ch. 1

S. does not use the phrase "propositional variable";
he uses "atomic formula" instead.

Defn. (Syntax of propositional logic)

1. All atomic formulas are formulas
2. If F is a formula, $\neg F$ is also a formula
3. If F and G are formulas, then $(F \vee G)$ and

vice

Defn (semantics of propositional logic)

$\{0, 1\}$ is the set of truth values
| |
f t
false true

An assignment is a function from a set of atomic formulas to $\{0, 1\}$. An assignment assigns 0 or 1 to one or more atomic formulas.

A variable assignment assigns 0 or 1 to

every atomic formula in a formula F .
More commonly, a suitable assignment for
a formula F is called an interpretation
of the formula.

"Tertium non datur."

If \mathcal{A} is a suitable assignment (interpretation)
for formula F , and $\mathcal{A}(F) = 1$, then you
say that \mathcal{A} is a model for F , or
equivalently F holds in \mathcal{A} , and

indicate this by $\models F$.

A formula F is satisfiable if it has at least one model; otherwise it is unsatisfiable or contradictory. (We say also that F is a contradiction.)

If F holds in every interpretation, then F is a valid formula or a tautology, and we write $\vDash F$.

Theorem (p. 2) : A formula F is a tautology iff $\neg F$ is unsatisfiable.

Exercise 3 gives the semantical equivalent (1 \Leftrightarrow 2) of (a generalized version of) the deduction theorem and its converse. (The ded. thm corresponds to $1 \rightarrow 2$; its converse to $2 \rightarrow 1$.)

$F_1, \dots, F_k \models G$ G (logically) follows
from F_1, \dots, F_k

G follows from F_1, \dots, F_k iff every
model of F_1, \dots, F_k is also a model of G .

This is the semantic (model-theoretic)
analogue of the syntactic (proof-theoretic)
notion of proof / derivation from hypotheses

$F_1, \dots, F_k \vdash G$

In the propositional calculus,
 $\vdash \phi$ iff $\models \phi$ (proved in
Yasuhara's ch. 9, b/c $\models \phi$ is a
shorthand for: ϕ is a tautology).

Also

$F_1, \dots, F_k \vdash \phi$ iff $F_1, \dots, F_k \models \phi$
(We do not prove this.)

$$\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k f_i \right) \rightarrow G \quad \equiv \quad (F_1 \rightarrow (F_2 \rightarrow \dots (F_k \rightarrow G) \dots))$$

$$F_1, \dots, F_k \models G \quad \stackrel{1 \rightarrow 2}{\Rightarrow} \quad (F_1 \rightarrow (F_2 \rightarrow \dots (F_k \rightarrow G) \dots))$$

$$(F_1 \rightarrow (F_2 \rightarrow \dots (F_k \rightarrow G) \dots)) \quad \stackrel{2 \rightarrow 1}{\Rightarrow} \quad F_1, \dots, F_k \models G$$

gen. analogue of
converse of deduction theorem

derivation
of \vdash from
Horn

Fact:

$$(A \wedge B) \rightarrow C \quad \text{iff} \quad (A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow C)).$$